This study examines whether accounting conservatism plays a risk management role with respect to operating cash flow downside risk, a key focus of risk management theory and practice. Unconditional (conditional) accounting conservatism is found to substitute for (complement) hedging in mitigating operating cash flow downside risk, consistent with its ex ante (ex post) application. As confirming evidence, we further document that accounting conservatism helps mitigate operating cash flow downside risk by reducing supply chain related operational risk. These findings lend support to a risk management role for accounting conservatism relevant to related literatures and continuing debates regarding conservatism's role as a pervasive and longstanding property of financial accounting.
The Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism for Operating Cash Flows
Introduction
This study provides evidence that accounting conservatism plays a risk management role for operating cash flows. This relationship is suggested by conservatism's definition and by mixed but suggestive prior findings that conservatism influences the downside properties of operating cash flows, a key focus of risk management theory and practice. Consistent with its ex ante (ex post) application, we find unconditional (conditional) accounting conservatism substitutes for (complements) real corporate hedging in mitigating operating cash flow downside risk. Confirmatory tests indicate that accounting conservatism helps reduce operating cash flow downside risk by managing operating risk proxied by the maturity mismatch between cash holdings and maturing debt, and by customer bargaining power. As such, this study provides initial evidence on conservatism's risk management role and its joint usage with hedging in mitigating cash flow downside risk, which extends related literatures and helps to inform ongoing deliberations regarding conservatism's continuing role as a central tenet of financial accounting.
A possible risk management role for accounting conservatism follows from its definition as "a prudent reaction to risk and uncertainty to ensure that uncertainty and risk inherent in business situations are adequately considered" in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 of the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) (1980, 10) . Yet despite suggestive but mixed evidence, no previous study directly examines the risk management role of accounting conservatism for operating cash flow downside risk. Notably, Francis and Martin (2010) find conservatism to improve investor monitoring over acquisitions and acquisition profitability that should reduce cash flow downside risk, and, Beatty et al. (2012) and Watts and Zuo (2012) find that conservatism promote voluntary hedging and alleviates underinvestment during financial crises, respectively. Conversely, Gigler et al. (2009) argue that conservatism triggers inefficient liquidations by hastening technical defaults, suggestive of enhanced cash flow downside risk, and Givoly and Hayn (2000), Shivakumar (2005, 2006) , and Jorgensen et al. (2012) suggest that conservatism increases earnings volatility and transitory negative earnings shocks. However, these studies do not explicitly examine relations between conservatism and operating cash flow downside risk. Thus, whether and how conservatism plays a risk management role for operating cash flows remains an open empirical question.
Examining the relation between accounting conservatism and cash flow downside risk is significant to the interests of investors and other stakeholders (managers, customers, suppliers, employees, etc.) . Real risk management instruments, except for cash holdings, require specialized business and financial expertise to execute and incur explicit costs, such as financial hedging and operating hedging (Disatnik et al. 2012) . In contrast, accounting-based risk management tools involve less cost and expertise (Pincus and Rajgopal 2002) . If conservatism manages specific risk exposures and ultimately mitigates cash flow downside risk, it provides a low-cost accounting-based risk management tool. Examining conservatism's risk management role is also relevant to ongoing debates regarding the benefits, costs, and continuing role of accounting conservatism as a longstanding central tenet of financial accounting. The FASB and International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) removed conservatism from their SFAC No. 8 by reasoning that it conflicts with neutrality.
However, if conservatism plays a risk management role and is related with hedging, a reconsideration of its continuing role may be warranted.
We focus on cash flow downside risk to explore the risk management role of accounting conservatism. Cash flow volatility rather than earnings volatility is the traditional focus of risk management because it reflects the effects of real risk management activities on firms'
operations (Smith and Stulz 1985; Froot et al. 1993; Zhang 2009 ). In contrast, earnings volatility captures the effects of accounting treatments in addition to the effects of real risk management activities (Zhang 2009 ). 1 In our setting, if conservatism manages firm risks and generates cash flow consequence, targeting on earnings volatility introduces mechanical relations between conservatism and its real risk management consequence and is thus inappropriate. Further, we particularly focus on cash flow downside risk rather than cash flow volatility because the goal of risk management is to eliminate the lower-tail rather than the volatility of cash flow (Stulz 1996; Miller 1998) . Rawls and Smithson (1993) concur that chief financial officers selectively manage cash flow downside risk rather than its volatility.
In addition, prospect and decision theories argue that managers, investors, and other firm stakeholders are loss averse and more attentive to downside risk than to upside potential (e.g., Roy 1952; Menezes et al. 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Koonce et al. 2005) . The combination of this view with the risk management argument suggests that firm stakeholders also prefer to focus on cash flow downside risk for firm risk management activities. 2 We propose and test whether unconditional and conditional accounting conservatism mitigate operating cash flow downside risk and whether they serve as a substitute for, and complement to hedging, respectively. Our reasoning follows from the definition of unconditional (conditional) conservatism as the ex ante (ex post) application of net income and net asset reducing accounting treatments that influence operating cash flow downside risk.
Specifically, by consistently lowering net income and assets, unconditional conservatism provides in advance for risk realizations via accrual cushions and precautionary savings (e.g.,
Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan 2010), thus reducing the need for real hedges. If unconditional conservatism and real hedges fail to adequately anticipate unexpected risk 1 Indeed, the objective of earnings smoothing, one accounting-based risk management tool, is to mitigate earnings volatility (Barton 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal 2002) . However, unlike accounting conservatism and real risk management instruments, earnings smoothing only manages accounting treatments rather than real firm risk exposures. 2 Particularly, for example, a top shareholder priority is to minimize downside risk and enhance firms' survival potentials (Dutta and Radner 1999) , and a debtholder's primary concern is to lower cash flow risk and default risk.
realizations and market shocks, conditional conservatism conveys bad news risk realizations that incentivize managers to use hedging to manage risk, and enhances investor monitoring over hedging activities (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Ball et al. 2008 ) thus augmenting real hedges. By so doing, unconditional and conditional conservatism help mitigate cash flow downside risk.
We next provide assurance that accounting conservatism affects operating cash flow downside risk by managing operational risk, which is incremental to its effect from improving investment efficiency or via a mechanical relation between accruals and cash flows. 3 Specifically, we examine how conservatism manage supply chain disruption risk, one type of operational risk, as proxied by maturity mismatch (the ratio of the difference between current debt and cash holdings to total assets) and customer bargaining power. Maturity mismatch indicates difficulties in servicing debts that can disrupt firm operations from the supply side and customer bargaining power reflects disruptions from the customer side. We predict that unconditional and conditional conservatism decrease operating cash flow risk by managing both types of supply chain disruption risks.
To test these propositions, we define cash flow downside risk as the probability and magnitude that cash flow drops below its expected level, and measure it as cash flow relative root lower partial moments (RRLPM), a dummy for high RRLPM, and cash flow at risk, extending Stone (1973 ), Fishburn (1977 , and Stein et al. (2001) . We add research and development (R&D) and advertising expenses back to cash flow to net out their confounding effects on cash flow downside risk. Extending Biddle et al. (2013) , we measure unconditional and conditional conservatism using principal components analysis (PCA) of their respective component measures, with conditional conservatism adjusted for asymmetric cash flow timeliness (Collin et al. 2012; . We employ logit models and Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression models to test the direct relation between conservatism and cash flow downside risk, and a system of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that extend Baron and Kenny (1986) instruments that interact differentially with hedging. Our study further complements risk management studies on the joint use of "real" risk management instruments such as cash holdings, hedging, and lines of credit (Allayannis et al. 2001; Vickery 2008; Bartram et al. 2010; Gamba and Triantis 2011; Disatnik et al. 2012 ) by advancing insights into interactions between accounting-based and real risk management tools.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses, Section 3 describes the research methodology, Section 4 reports the main empirical results, Section 5 conducts further analyses and sensitivity tests, and Section 6 concludes. Appendix 1 elaborates on cash flow expectation models and Appendix 2 provides variable definitions. conservatism is the focus of auditors and regulators because it is a major contributor to total conservatism and is employed systematically and frequently over a long period (Ryan 2006) .
Hypothesis development

The risk management role of accounting conservatism
It is also easier to assess via routine audits and does not engender bad news or regulatory "shocks" from which auditors and regulators want to evade their responsibilities (Qiang 2007 hedging that commits firms to meet debt obligations (Bessembinder 1991) and it constrains managerial risk-shifting behaviors (Campbell and Kracaw 1990; Beatty et al. 2012 ). For example, Beatty et al. (2012) find conditional conservatism to induce borrower firms to voluntarily commit to interest rate swaps. Third, unlike unconditional conservatism, conditional conservatism is less likely to substitute for real hedging. Even though it is a less costly accounting-based risk management instrument, conditional conservatism cannot preclude and preempt a precautionary hedge for a risk it recognizes because it is a smaller contributor to conservatism applied ex post and sporadically (Ryan 2006) , and thus is also impossible to substitute an ongoing hedging program through its consistent application.
Fourth, managers, auditors, and regulators are disinclined to "bad news" shocks associated with conditional conservatism and have incentives to mitigate their negative consequences because these shocks induce compensation changes, regulatory attention, and are costly to monitor (Qiang 2007) . As such, new real hedging is an appealing response to the negative shocks conveyed by conditional conservatism. In short, the above reasoning leads to the following hypotheses: 
Data, measures and estimation models
Data
We examine a sample of 28,425 firm-year observations with available data for firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for fiscal years 1992 to 2007. We omit firm-years in the lower five percent of the total asset distribution to mitigate small denominator bias 9 and delete industry-years with fewer than twenty observations to estimate cash flow benchmark models more accurately. We require at least five years of continuous data for calculating cash flow downside risk, which induces a survival bias of some degree. We winsorize all variables 
Cash flow downside risk measures
Detailed below are three cash flow downside risk measures used in this study: the RRLPM of cash flow Rlpm_OCF, an indicator that cash flow drops below its expected level DOCF, and cash flow at risk CFaR. The measure DOCF is a dummy variable, the simplest of the three but insensitive to the magnitude of cash flow downside risk; Rlpm_OCF considers the magnitude of cash flow downside risk and incorporates all loss levels; CFaR considers only the extreme loss case and is computationally complex.
Cash flow downside risk measures within the RRLPM framework
Cash flow downside risk measures Rlpm_OCF and DOCF belong to the RRLPM 9 We follow Stein et al. (2001) to do so. Our results do not qualitatively change when the 1 percent cutoff is used. 10 The 10-K annual reports for U.S. listed firms in the Edgar Online database are available for fiscal years 1994 to 2007.
framework derived from the concept of lower partial moment (LPM) that means including only the downside distribution of a variable relative to its reference level in moment calculation (Stone 1973; Fishburn 1977) . The continuous case of cash flow LPM for firm i,
where τ is the cash flow target level, f(γ i ) is the probability density function for firm i's cash flow, and α is a moment indicator that reflects the relative importance of the magnitude by which cash flow deviates below its target level. 11 The discrete case of firm i's cash flow LPM
where N is the number of observations for calculating the cash flow LPM. The root of the cash flow LPM, RLPM, possesses linear homogeneity of degree one such that changes in τ and in the RLPM are proportional; its discrete case for firm i when α = 2 is
Corresponding to the cash flow RLPM, we also estimate a root upper partial moment of cash flow, RUPM, which captures cash flow upside potential. Since a higher RUPM usually accompanies a higher RLPM, we construct a relative RLPM measure RRLPM, which deflates RLPM by RUPM to control for firm-level differences in upside potential, such that cash flow downside risk is comparable across firms. RRLPM further applies a logarithmic transformation to normalize the distribution of the cash flow RLPM.
Cash flow RRLPM Rlpm_OCF. Rlpm_OCF refers to the ranked natural logarithm of the ratio of one plus the cash flow RLPM to one plus the cash flow RUPM, both estimated over a three-year horizon covering the current and previous two years:
where
representing the cash flow RLPM and RUPM, respectively. Iέ it≤0 is an indicator that equals one if έ it < 0 and zero otherwise, where έ it is the residual estimated from the industry-specific OLS regressions of the cash flow expectation model
where OCF is the ratio of annual cash flow adjusted for R&D expenditures and advertising to total assets. This adjustment is to ensure that the estimated Rlpm_OCF is free of the effects of (5) incorporates cash flow level and volatility (Minton et al. 2002) and other cash flow determinants such as firm size, sales (Dechow 1994; Dechow et al. 1998) , and leverage. Further model details are described in Appendix 1.
Cash flow RLPM indicator DOCF. DOCF is a dummy variable equal to one if the actual cash flow is below its expectation estimated from Eq. (5) and zero otherwise.
Cash flow downside risk measures within the VaR framework
Cash flow at risk CFaR. CFaR refers to the ranked ratio of the worst case of quarterly cash flow at the one percent confidence level to the predicted quarterly cash flow estimated from Eq. (6) below. We employ a comparables approach to calculate CFaR over a rolling window of seventeen fiscal quarters, extending Stein et al. (2001) :
where OCFQ is the ratio of quarterly cash flow adjusted for R&D and advertising expenditures to total assets, with the adjustment to ensure that CFaR is free from the effects of immediately expensing R&D and marketing expenditures under SFAS No. 2 and No. 142, and thus reflects only cash flow insufficiency.
Accounting conservatism measures
Unconditional conservatism is measured using UC_PCA, the factor score from a principal components analysis of three component unconditional conservatism measures following Biddle et al. (2013) : UC_ACC (total accrual, adapted from Ahmed et al. 2002) , UC_BM (the ranked industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio), and UC_RES (hidden reserve in Penman and Zhang 2002) . Extending Biddle et al. (2013) , conditional conservatism is measured using CC_PCA, the factor score generated from a principal components analysis of three conditional conservatism measures, where CC_AR and CC_CR are adjusted for asymmetric cash flow timeliness and then denoted CC_ARA and CC_CRA respectively. This adjustment removes from conditional conservatism the effects of asymmetric cash flow timeliness that overstate market-based conditional conservatism measures (Collin et al. 2012 (Collin et al. , 2013 and add noise to tests for the effects of conditional conservatism on cash flow downside risk.
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CC_ARA. CC_ARA is the ranked ratio of the sum of the CScore_ACC and GScore_ACC to the GScore_ACC estimated from an extended Khan and Watts (2009) model that replaces earnings with accruals to retain only asymmetric accrual timeliness.
14 CScore_ACC types of risk exposure rather than the value effect and uses expected cash flow estimated from the quarterly cash flow model as a deflator to facilitate cross-sectional comparisons between firms. The comparables approach is a nonparametric method that sorts firms with similar risk features into pools of comparable peers to construct samples of negative cash flow shocks for estimating tail probabilities. 13 Asymmetric cash flow timeliness could inflate CC_AR and CC_CR and increase cash flow downside risk simultaneously, leading to a spurious positive relation between them, which weakens the power of our hypothesis testing. Therefore, it is important in this study to net out asymmetric cash flow timeliness from conditional conservatism measures. 14 CC_CRA. CC_CRA is the ranked ratio of current accrual shocks to total accrual news multiplied by negative one for good accrual news. It focuses on the asymmetric timeliness of bad relative to good accrual news, extending Callen et al. (2010) and Biddle et al. (2013) . 
Estimation methodology and models
Direct tests for the effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism on cash flow downside risk
Eq. (7) tests H1 regarding the direct effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism on subsequent cash flow downside risk, with H1 predicting γ 1 < 0:
where 15 Specifically, we replace earnings with accruals (acc) and cash flow (cf) in the return decomposition model: 
Then we estimate
where η t refers to the vector (η 1t, η 2t, η 3t η 4t )', I is an identity matrix, and A is a parameter matrix. We then calculate CC_CRA = η 2t /Nacc t if Nacc t < 0 and CC_ACCA t = -η 2t /Nacc t if Nacc t > 0.
Eq. (7) is a logit model for DOCF and a Fama-MacBeth (1973) (9) rather than the original value of risk to address the concern that conservatism causes a spurious relation between a risk variable and cash flow downside risk.
17 16 Particularly, these control variables include capital investment intensity Invest_Capx, R&D investment intensity Invest_RD, organizational slack SLACK, human resource slack SLACK_EMP, firm size Size, return on total assets ROA, leverage ratio Leverage, operating options OO, past return volatility Sigma, CEO effort-taking incentives CEO_Delta and CEO risk-taking incentives CEO_Vega, and dummies for Fama-French (1997) industry classifications, Ind, and for fiscal years, Year. There is no consensus regarding the sources of cash flow downside risk in the literature. Zhang (2009) suggests that the determinants of cash flow volatility include the intensity of plant, property, and equipment (-), Size (-), Invest_RD (+), Leverage (+), Sigma (+), CEO_Delta (-), and CEO_Vega (+). Similarly, Ang et al. (2006) document a high downside beta in firms with high return on equity, small firm size, high asset growth, low book-to-market ratio, high return volatility, high past downside betas, and past winners. Other studies show that past organizational slackness (Miller and Reuler 1996) and operating options proxied by capitalized fixed assets (Driouchi and Bennett 2010) reduce downside risk.
where CON = UC_PCA or CC_PCA and Risk = Mismatch or Rsize. H2a predicts b 1 > 0, b 2 > 0, and γ 5 < 0 for the effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism on cash flow downside risk via the maturity mismatch channel; H2b predicts γ 2 < 0 and γ 3 < 0 to reflect their mitigation of the adverse effects customer bargaining power on cash flow downside risk.
Extended Heckman (1979) model for relations between conservatism and hedging
We use the extended Heckman (1979) 19 Eq.
17 Controls1 differs in terms of dependent variable, maturity mismatch Mismatch, or customer bargaining power CBP. For Mismatch, Controls1 includes firm size Size, return on assets ROA, capital ratio CAP, bond market liquidity spread Repo, change in the three-month T-bill rate 3M, and industrial and year dummies, extending Kim et al. (2013) . For customer bargaining power CBP, Controls1 includes industry and year dummies. 18 We use firms that have never initiated any hedging programs as control firms. In our specification, the first differencing level is the change in unconditional or conditional conservatism before and after the initiation of a hedging program for each treatment firm. The second differencing level is the change in unconditional or conditional conservatism between control and treatment firms, to remove the impact of other changes concurrent with the initiation of new hedging programs from the first-level differencing. The implicit assumption is that other changes affect both treatment and control firms similarly. 19 Determinants of derivative hedging identified in the risk management literature (Smith and Stulz 1985; Graham and Smith 1999; Barton 2001; Zhang 2009) Table 4 presents the regression results for testing H2a and H2b that unconditional and conditional conservatism mitigate cash flow downside risk via the maturity mismatch channel and by constraining the detrimental effects of customer bargaining power, respectively. We measure maturity mismatch as the ratio of the difference between current debt and cash holdings to total assets and denote it Mismatch. We estimate customer bargaining power Rsize as the ratio of the average market value of a customer's industry to the supply firm's equity market value, and then deflate it by 100, following Hui et al. (2012) . The untabulated first-stage OLS regressions orthogonalize unconditional and conditional conservatism against maturity mismatch or customer bargaining power respectively together with other controls.
Main empirical results
Descriptive analysis
21
The maturity mismatch regression reported in Table 4 shows that UC_PCA_R it-1 and CC_PCA_R it-1 are significantly negatively associated with subsequent maturity mismatch Mismatch it , with coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.0721 (-13.47) and -0.0104 (-4.37), respectively. The economic interpretation is that a one standard deviation increase in unconditional (conditional) conservatism, which is 0.2170 (0.3283), reduces maturity 20 The control variables coefficients are generally consistent with expectations. Leverage is significantly positively associated with cash flow downside risk in all models, consistent with the intuition that distressed firms suffer more shocks to operations and thus have higher cash flow downside risk; R&D investment is significantly negatively related with cash flow downside risk consistent with R&D signaling cash flow upside potential; ROA, operational options OO, CEO riskaverse incentives and CEO_Delta are negatively related with cash flow downside risk. 21 We use the estimated residuals UC_PCA_R it-1 and CC_PCA_R it-1 to proxy for unconditional and conditional conservatism respectively in later stage tests for maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power. mismatch by 156.5 (34.14) basis points. This evidence is supportive of unconditional and conditional conservatism serving to alleviate disruptions to firm supply and operations. In turn, the estimated residual from the mismatch regression, Mismatch_R it-1 , is significantly positively associated with subsequent cash flow downside risk Rlpm_OCF it in the third-stage OLS regression, with a coefficient (t-statistic) of 0.0184 (3.75). That means a one standard deviation increase in maturity mismatch, which is 0.1358, increases Rlpm_OCF it by 25.00 basis points. The result is consistent with a high mismatch being associated with disruptions to firm operations from the supply side that translate into increased cash flow downside risk.
It also suggests that maturity mismatch works as a mediating channel by which unconditional and conditional conservatism reduce cash flow downside risk. The meditating effect of mismatch is equal to -0.0013 (= 0.0184*(-0.0721)) for unconditional conservatism and -0.0002 (=0.0184*(-0.0104)) for conditional conservatism. Altogether, these findings lend support to H2a regarding the maturity mismatch channel.
The rightmost two columns of Table 4 report estimation results regarding the indirect effects of unconditional and conditional conservatism for reducing the effects of customer bargaining power on firm operations and cash flow downside risk. Consistent with predictions, the OLS regression for customer bargaining power Rsize shows that unconditional and conditional conservatism measures UC_PCA_R it-1 and CC_PCA_R it-1 , respectively, are insignificantly associated with customer bargaining power Rsize, consistent with the intuition that conservatism in a supplier firm does not affect customer bargaining power because the latter is mainly determined by the customer firm's industry-and firmspecific characteristics. Although conservatism does not affect customer bargaining power per se, it can still moderate the detrimental effects of customer bargaining power on cash flow downside risk. The last OLS regression for Rlpm_OCF reported in Table 4 indicates that the interactions of the two types of conservatism with customer bargaining power, 
Corporate hedging and relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash flow downside risk
Further analysis and sensitivity tests
Investor monitoring and the risk management role of accounting conservatism
An alternative explanation for the observed negative relation between conservatism and cash flow downside risk is that investor monitoring both enhances conservatism and reduces cash flow downside risk. To address this possibility, we use a two-stage least squares model to determine whether our main results are robust to investor monitoring. Specifically, the first stage OLS model regresses unconditional or conditional conservatism on variables for monitoring by investors including blockholders, shareholders, and debtholders. We use the negative of GScore to represent blockholder monitoring (Gompers et al. 2003) , percentage institutional ownership to proxy for institutional shareholder monitoring, and the ratio of long-term debt to total long-term and short-term debts to represent debtholder monitoring.
We then use the estimated residuals to replace their original values to net out the effect of investor monitoring on conservatism.
23 Table 6 reports the estimation results indicating that all measures for investor monitoring increase unconditional and conditional conservatism, with a significantly positive coefficient for institutional ownership. More significantly, the second-stage OLS regression for Rlpm_OCF indicates that both types of conservatism 23 Gscore gauges the balance of power between shareholders and top executives (Gompers et al. 2003) . Using data on twenty-four governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center and state takeover law data for three years-1990 years- , 1993 years- , 1995 years- , and 1998 years- -Gompers et al. (2003 construct Gscore for each firm in their sample by adding one point for every provision that reduces shareholder rights. Thus, a higher Gscore indicates less power for shareholders and hence a less well-governed firm and the higher the negative of Gscore, the greater the power of shareholders and hence a better-governed firm. We obtain data for GScore and board structure from RiskMetrics, data for institutional shareholdings from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings Database, and data for board duality information from ExecuComp, as indicated by a current CEO with the title chairman, chmn, Chairman, CHAIRMAN, Chmn, or CHMN. continue to significantly decrease subsequent cash flow downside risk, confirming that their relation is robust to the effects of investor monitoring. Thus, the results in Table 6 suggest that unconditional and conditional conservatism play a risk management role for operating cash flow downside risk beyond of the effects of investor monitoring.
Firm size and the risk management role of accounting conservatism
Small firms are often financially constrained and small firm size is considered an important rationale for firms to engage in risk management activities (e.g., Froot et al. 1993 ).
The risk management literature in finance further finds small firms to be sensitive to interest rate shocks (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist 1994; Ehrmann 2000) . To reduce the possibility that our results are influenced by these effects, we control for firm size in all regression results reported above. When we further omit the lowest tercile of observations sorted by firm size, untablulated results confirm that our main results are qualitatively unchanged for the subsample of large firm observations.
Earnings smoothing and the risk management role of accounting conservatism
Earnings smoothing is an accrual-based risk management tool that reduces earnings volatility and substitutes for hedging (Barton 2001) . It also can be characterized as "conservatism gaming," whereby a higher level of conservatism is applied in good economic times and a lower level of conservatism in bad times (Biddle et al. 2013) . We expect the risk management role of conservatism to be insensitive to the effect of earnings smoothing because conservatism targets real firm risk, rather than earnings volatility, and actually increases earnings volatility as suggested by Givoly and Hayn (2000), Ball and Shivakumar (2005 , 2006 ), and Jorgensen et al. (2012 . In contrast, the primary objective of earnings smoothing is not to manage real firm risk but rather to reduce earnings volatility (Barton 2001 
Alternative Rlpm_OCF-based cash flow downside risk measures
To confirm that our main results are robust to different cash flow expectation models for calculating the cash flow downside risk measure Rlpm_OCF, we examine the following alternative cash flow benchmarks: the previous year's industry mean cash flow, the mean of firm-specific cash flow in the previous five years, and zero cash flow. We denote the cash flow RRLPMs thus calculated as DR_OCFind, DR_OCFpre, and DR_OCFzero, respectively.
To examine whether our results are robust to alternative formula specifications for defining Rlpm_OCF, we alternatively define Rlpm_OCF2 as the natural logarithm of one plus the cash flow RLPM without deflating by the cash flow RUPM and define Rlpm_OCF3 as the natural logarithm of one plus the cash flow RLPM deflated by the standard deviation of cash flow.
Panel A of Table 7 reports the estimation results and reveals that the negative relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash flow risk are robust to these alternative Rlpm_OCF measures. In addition, to address the concern that the CFaR measure may be unreliable because the quarterly cash flow expectation model involves eight independent variables and is estimated using seventeen firm-quarter observations, we drop the quarter dummies with qualitatively unchanged results. We also use negative one times earnings skewness relative to cash flow skewness, SKEW, as a conditional conservatism measure, but we use its predicted value from the following model to net out asymmetrical cash flow timeliness:
Alternative unconditional and conditional conservatism measures
We denote the predicted SKEW it CC_Skew and calculate CC_PCAA as the factor score generated from a PCA of CC_Skew, CC_ACM, and CC_CRA. Panel E of Table 7 indicate that the relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and cash flow downside risk observed above are robust to alternative measures.
Alternative measures for maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power
We also consider alternative measures for maturity mismatch Mismatcha and customer bargaining power RHHI. Mismatcha is the ratio of current liabilities minus cash holdings to total assets and RHHI is the concentration ratio of a customer's four-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry relative to that of the firm's. RHHI extends 25 A possible concern is that these results are influenced by R&D and marketing expenditures that increase cash flow downside risk and hidden reserves and thus unconditional conservatism Penman and Zhang 2002) , which creats a spurious relation between conservatism and cash flow downside risk, particularly when R&D is financed in stages (Bergemann et al. 2011 ). But we already address this possibility by adjusting all cash flow downside risk measures for R&D expenditures and controlling for the effects of R&D expenditures in all multivariate regressions of cash flow downside risk on conservatism measures. As a further check, we use a subsample without R&D expenditures to regress cash flow downside risk on conservatism measures using Eq. (7), and find that the negative relation is qualitatively unchanged.
the concentration ratio in Hui et al. (2012) by assuming that it is a relative concept depending on customer bargaining power of a firm and its customers. When using these measures to reexamine H2a and H2b regarding the indirect effects of conservatism on cash flow downside risk via maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power, the results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3 .
Conclusion
This study investigates whether accounting conservatism serves a risk management role for operating cash flows as follows from its definition and suggestive prior findings that it influences operating cash flows downside properties, a key focus of risk management theory and practice. Our findings indicate that (1) This study contributes to the conservatism literature by articulating a risk management role of accounting conservatism and providing supportive evidence. We further advance insights into relations between conservatism and operating cash flow downside risk via maturity mismatch and customer bargaining power that help validate the relations.
Importantly, our evidence that accounting conservatism serves as an accounting-based risk management instrument related to hedging extends the risk management literature. Our findings also have practical implications for economic policymaking and accounting standard setting by suggesting conservatism as a low-cost accounting-based risk management tool.
Our results also help inform ongoing deliberations regarding conservatism's role as a central tenet of financial accounting. This study's findings of a risk management role for accounting conservatism with regard to operating cash flow downside risk open several avenues for future research. In particular, follow-on studies can examine how conservatism relates to other risk dimensions and risk management tools, and related implications for managers and policymakers. where OCF refers to the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets. Eq. (A1) combines an autoregressive AR (3) structure with the economic determinants of cash flow. We incorporate the autoregressive structure because Dechow et al. (1998) report that it improves cash flow predictability for future cash flow. We also include sales turnover SALE, measured as the ratio of total sales to total assets, because it is a major determinant of both cash flow and earnings, as suggested by Barth et al. (2001) and Dechow et al. (1998) . Further, SALE can replace the earnings-based profitability measure, another documented determinant of future cash flow (e.g., Barth et al. 2005; Kim and Kross 2005) , has the advantage of not introducing endogeneity between conservatism and cash flow downside risk, unlike earnings. Both Size and the operating cycle OC are employed as determinants for cash flow in prior research (e.g., Dechow et al. 1998 ). However, Hui et al. (2012) suggest that conservatism shortens operating cycles by increasing trading contract efficiencies and therefore we omit it from Eq. (A1). Eq. (A1) also includes Leverage, which has dual effects on cash flow. Opler and Titman (1994) document that financially distressed firms lose significant market shares to their healthy counterparts during industry downturns, and Froot et al. (1993) suggest that higher leverage causes firms to forgo positive net present value projects due to costly external financing. Leverage also proxies for interest expenses when firm size is controlled for. SFAS No. 95 requires reporting interest expenses as a cash flow item rather than as a financing flow item, which results in a negative mechanical relation between Leverage and subsequent cash flow. However, high Leverage also implies that firms have already used sufficient external financing to support operations and investment activities, which increases subsequent cash flow. Therefore, the relation between Leverage and cash flow is an open empirical question. Industry cash flow risk is a determinant of cash flow predictability, yet estimation by the industry at least partially controls for this industry effect. In addition, firm-specific cash flow risk increases cash flow uncertainty and difficulties in predicting cash flow (Minton et al. 2002) . Therefore we include cash flow volatility STD_OCF in Eq. (A1) and calculate it as the volatility of quarterly cash flow over the current and previous eleven fiscal quarters, with a minimum requirement of four quarters of data. STD_OCF thus calculated avoids missing data, as does cash flow volatility calculated using annual cash flow, and we find that they are positively correlated, suggesting that the former is an appropriate substitute for the latter in our research setting. Lastly, we add year dummies to capture temporal factors that affect cash flow predictability.
Appendix 1 Benchmark models for operating cash flow
Following the intuition of Stein et al. (2001) , we delete firm-years below the lower-tail five percent of total assets for a given fiscal year to alleviate concerns that small firm size could disproportionately inflate the cash flow ratio and bias cash flow predictions, which results in 73,598 firm-year observations. We fit Eq. (A1) by Fama-French (1997) industry classifications and the average R-square is 0.2390. We fit the model by industry rather than by year because cash flow properties are shaped more by industry features. The average R-square drops from about twenty-four to eighteen percent when the model is fitted by fiscal year with industry dummies. The coefficients for OCF t , OCF t-2 , SALE t , and Size t are significantly positive in most industries, but those for Leverage are mixed (significantly positive in eight industries and significantly negative in seven industries), consistent with mixed evidence in prior studies. The mean values and t-statistics of the estimated coefficients for Eq. (A1) are as follows: When we use the market value of equity to deflate cash flow, the results are qualitatively unchanged. We use estimated residuals and fitted values from Eq. (A1) to calculate the DOCF and Rlpm_OCF used in our main tests. We also use ROA instead of SALE in Eq. (A1) and the results are qualitatively unchanged as well, indicating that the endogeneity problem induced by ROA is not serious. We also include the operating cycle OC in Eq. (A1), with OC defined as the average time between purchasing or acquiring inventory and receiving cash from the sales and calculated as the natural logarithm of 360 days times the ratios of average accounts receivable to total revenue and of average inventory to the cost of goods. The results are qualitatively unchanged for this treatment. We also find that the coefficients of OC are insignificant for most industries and the addition of OC does not greatly improve the R-squared statistic.
Invest_RD: the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. Leverage: the ratio of the sum of long-term and short-term debts to total assets. LOSS: a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has negative income for the current fiscal year and zero otherwise. NWC: the ratio of working capital net of cash holdings to total assets. OO: the ratio of total property, plant, and equipment to total assets. ROA: the ratio of net income to total assets. Sigma: the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns calculated over the prior twelve months. Size: the natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity, total liabilities, and the carrying value of preferred stock. SLACK: the average of the industry-adjusted ratio of inventory to total revenue, the industry-adjusted ratio of accounts receivable to total revenue, and the industry-adjusted ratio of selling, general, and administrative expense to total revenue. SLACK_EMP: the industry-adjusted ratio of the total number of employees at fiscal year-end to total revenue. INT_BD: the ratio of interest expense to operating income before depreciation and interest. INT: the interaction of R&D investment (Invest_RD) and the leverage ratio (Leverage). NOL: an indicator variable equal to one for positive net income and positive net operating loss carryforwards and zero otherwise. CEO_Vega: the natural logarithm of one plus the sensitivity of CEO firm-specific equity-based wealth to a one percent change in stock return volatility. CEO_Delta: the natural logarithm of one plus the sensitivity of CEO firm-specific equity-based wealth to a one percent change in stock price. BAS: the average daily percentage of the bid-ask spread in the fiscal year. CAP: the ratio of book value of equity to total assets. 3M: the change in the three-month T-bill rate. Repo: proxy for bond market illiquidity measured as the difference between the three-month general collateral repo rate and the three-month T-bill rate. 
